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STATE OF UTAH, 
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MINNETTE M. RIEDMAN, 
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) Supreme Court No. 
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BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The State claims in its Petition that the Court of 
Appeals decision to the effect that theft by receiving is 
substantively different than theft by concealing is in conflict 
with Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-403, and State v. Taylor, 570 P.2d 
697 (Utah 1977). 
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is appended to the 
State's Petition as Appendix A. 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of the court is conceded. 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Utah Code Annotated § 77-35-4(d) 
The Court may permit an indictment of information 
to be amended at any time before verdict if no 
additional or different offenses charged jancl 
substant ial r ights of the defendant are not 
p r S J J K H ce^d. After verdict, an indie tmen t or 
TnTormatTbn may be amended so as to state the 
offense with such particularity as to bar a 
subsequent set of facts. (Emphasis added) 
2. Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-403. 
Conduct denominated theft in this part constitutes 
a single offense embracing the separate offenses 
such as those heretofore known as larceny, larceny 
by trick, larceny by bailees, embezzlement, false 
pretense, extortion, blackmail, receiving stolen 
property. An accusation of theft may be supported 
by evidence that it was committed in any manner 
specified in sections 76-6-404 through 76-6-410, 
subject to the power of the cour t to ensure a. fa i r 
tr ial by grant ing a. cont inuance or other 
appropr iate relief where the conduct of the defense 
woul d be pr e j udTced by 1 ack of fair notice or by 
surpr ise. (Emphas is adde~d7 
3. Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-408(1). 
A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or 
disposes of the property of another knowing that it 
has been stolen, or believing that it probably has 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or 
aids in concealing, selling or withholding any such 
property from the owner, knowing the property to be 
stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Proceedings Below. 
Respondents , having been charged wi th t h e f t by r e c e i v i n g 
were bound over , a r r a i g n e d and complet|ed ju ry s e l e c t i o n when the 
t r i a l c o u r t p e r m i t t e d a m e n d m e n t of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n , o v e r 
d e f e n d a n t s o b j e c t i o n , to inc lude a charge of t h e f t by concea l ing . 
Defendants were conv ic ted and sentenced upon the amended o f f e n s e . 
On c o n s o l i d a t e d a p p e a l s , t h e Court of A p p e a l s r e v e r s e d 
the c o n v i c t i o n s of defendant on the grounds tha t the amendment of 
the in fo rmat ion m i d - t r i a l over de fendan t ' s o b j e c t i o n v i o l a t e d Rule 
4(b) of t he Utah R u l e s of C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e ( 7 7 - 3 5 - 4 ( d ) U.C.A. 
1953 as amended) . A p e t i t i o n for r e h e a r i n g was d e n i e d . (See 
Appendix B to S t a t e ' s P e t i t i o n ) . 
B. Relevant F a c t s . 
The i n f o r m a t i o n f i l e d on December 20, 1983, c h a r g e d 
t h e f t by r e c e i v i n g . On May 16, 1984, t h e S t a t e f i l e d an amended 
in format ion adding the fo l lowing languag^: 
". . . or c o n c e a l e d , w i t h h e l d , or a i d e d in 
c o n c e a l i n g or w i t h h o l d i n g any such p r o p e r t y from 
the owner , knowing t h e p r o p e r t y to be s t o l e n . . ." 
Defendants r ece ived n o t i c e of the proposed amendment on 
May 17, and on May 23 , d e f e n d a n t ' s f i l e d a Mot ion for B i l l of 
P a r t i c u l a r s s e e k i n g s p e c i f i c a t i o n of t h e t h e o r y of g u i l t upon 
which t h e S t a t e would r e l y a t t r i a l . Oh June 19 a f t e r t h e j u r y 
had been s e l e c t e d , sworn and admonished, the S t a t e fo rmal ly moved 
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to amend the information and over defendant's objection, the court 
granted the State's motion. (R. 2-5). After defendants entered 
pleas of not guilty to the amended information, the trial 
proceeded onward and the jury found defendant's guilty as charged 
on June 22, 1984. 
The case arose out of a theft of one 18' wide coil of 
copper sheet weighing approximately 2500 pounds and 8' x 15" 
fabricated panels from Western Sheet Metal. An employee of the 
victim advised local salvage yards to be on the look out for three 
coils of copper sheet totaling 10,000 pounds and 500 pounds of 
pie-shaped scrap. (R. 41-44; 52-53 and 333-337). No mention was 
made of the 8 foot panels nor was defendant Riedman, who took the 
phone call from the employee, advised a single spool of coil 
weighed some 1,250 pounds. (R. 52-53; 333-337). 
The burglars took the stolen copper to Industrial 
Salvage where they drove directly to a shed in the back of the 
yard, unloaded the copper and received a yard receipt from an 
employee of Industrial Salvage. That yard receipt was paid by 
defendant Riedman. (R. 28-30; 328-330). 
An employee of the victim questioned Riedman about the 
10,000 pound coil and pie-shaped scraps but Riedman denied 
knowledge. Later that day to detectives, having obtained an 
investigative subpoena for the sale records of Industrial Salvage 
for that day, requested the sales records. Riedman, at Ramon's 
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r e q u e s t i n d i c a t e d t h a t she had no knoWledge of i t s w h e r e a b o u t s , 
but a s h o r t t i m e l a t e r , a f t e r c o n f e r r i n g w i t h h i s c o u n s e l , 
defendant Ramon su r rende red the r e c e i p t book to the d e t e c t i v e s . 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT FOR 
THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF CRIMINAL RULE 4(d), THEFT BY 
RECEIVING AND THEFT BY CONCEALING ARE SUFFICIENTLY 
DISSIMILAR TO PROHIBIT AMENDING AN INFORMATION 
DURING TRIAL OVER OBJECTION 
After jury selection had b^en completed, the State 
moved to amend the original information on file to add the 
disjunctive concealment language contained in Utah's Theft Statue, 
§ 76-6-408(1). The trial court granted the motion over objection 
of defendants and arraigned defendants anew on the amended 
charge, thereafter proceeding with the trial which resulted in a 
jury verdict of guilty. 
Rule 4(d) of the Utah Rules oIf Criminal Procedure, § 
77-35-4(d), U.C.A. 1953 as amended, provides, in pertinent part, 
as follows: 
"The cour t may permi t an ind ic tment or in format ion 
to be amended a t any t i m e bejfore v e r d i c t if no 
a d d i t i o n a l or d i f f e r e n t o f fens^ is charged and the 
s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e d e f e n d a n t a r e n o t 
p r e j u d i c e d . " 
The Cour t of A p p e a l s , in p a r t i a l r e l i a n c e upon S t a t e v. 
P e t e r s o n , 681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984) , r e v e r s e d t h e c o n v i c t i o n s of 
both defendants on the grounds t ha t Rule ^(d) as quoted above, did 
n o t p e r m i t t h e a m e n d m e n t s when t h ^ f t by r e c e i v i n g had 
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substantially different elements that theft by concealment. State 
v. Ramon, 57 Utah Advance Reporter at 33. 
In State v. Peterson, supra, it was held that a mere 
semantic modification, without altering the basic charge, was 
within the provisions of Rule 4(d). The court had held that a 
change from assault with "serious bodily injury" to an assault 
with "force likely to produce death" was a change which did not 
prejudice defendants substantial rights. (J_d. at 1220-1221). 
The defense in that case was one of "alibi" and which defense was 
totally unaffected by the corpus delicti of the crime or 
unaffected by the specific factual details of the offense other 
than the identify of the p e r p e t r a t o r . (JM. at 12 1 4 ) . 
Furthermore, in Peterson, the defendant had the full benefit of a 
preliminary hearing on two separate occasions upon joined counts. 
Justice Stewart in his separate opinion, in whicl 
Justice Durham joined, argued that even the slightly semantically 
distinguishable basis for the aggravated assault could change the 
nature of the defense, for now medical testimony suddenly became 
more important that anticipated. Such focus on the second part of 
Rule 4(d), which requires inquiry into whether the substantial 
rights of the defendant are prejudiced by the amendment, was 
deemed pivotal by two justices even though the defense theory was 
predicated upon an alibi theory. In the case at bar, the Court of 
Appeals properly perceived that the theory of defense would not be 
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unaffected but in fact required a shift of the defense because of 
the differing substantive elements of the crimes and thusly was 
prohibited by Rule 4(d). 
The Statefs reliance on State v. Taylor, 570 P.2d 697 
(Utah 1977) may be inappropriate sinci that case addressed the 
trial court's refusal to dismiss and/or instruct with respect to 
differing theft theories. The decision certainly did not intend 
to interpret Rule 4(d) or encompass a situation in which the 
theory of the case changed after pr el infiinary hearing and during 
tr ial. 
As noted in State v. Bair, 67i P.2d 203 (Utah 1983) the 
crimes of theft within § 76-6-408 of the Utah Code as amended, ". 
. . are separate and distinct substantive definitions . . " (Id. 
at 208). The court was careful to guard against erroneous 
interpretation of the general the 
specifically as follows: 
£ t statute by stating 
"The statute does not, however, go ji s tep fur ther 
and say^ that prooT eTtablTsh ing one subs tant i ve 
definit ion, such as "receiv ij 1^" stolen proper ty, 
will support an accusat ion of another substantive 
defin it ion, such ~ s "retaining" stolen property or 
"taking" the property of another. Whether, under 
pr inc ipal s o? consolidation, jfhe statute may be 
thus extended is a question that has not been 
addressed by the court, nor do we find it necessary 
to address the question now.1 (Emphasis added, 
footnote omitted) (Ibid) 
It is without question that the cofpus delicti of theft by 
receiving is different than the crime ofl theft by concealing or 
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aiding in the concealment. When the elements of both offenses are 
compared side-by-side, as did the Court of Appeals at 57 Utah 
Advanced Reports 32, there appeared to be differences in and among 
three out of the four elements of the two substantive crimes. 
The fact remains that defendants came prepared to try 
one theory of a case but were forced, over objection, to change to 
a different substantive theory of defense after the jury had been 
duly empaneled. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals properly rules that a mid-trial 
amendment of the information was prohibited by Rule 4(d) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The StateTs Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari should be denied. 
DATED this X day of September, 1987. 
M A R T m VERHOI 
Attorney for Defendanl 
8 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
to the Utah Court of Appeals postage prepaid, to the following 
this /) day of September, 1987, 
David L. Wilkinson 
State Attorney General 
Kimberly K. Hornak 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
9 
